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We propose a cheat sensitive quantum protocol to perform a private search on a classical database
which is efficient in terms of communication complexity. It allows a user to retrieve an item from the
server in possession of the database without revealing which item she retrieved: if the server tries to
obtain information on the query, the person querying the database can find it out. Furthermore our
protocol ensures perfect data privacy of the database, i.e. the information that the user can retrieve
in a single queries is bounded and does not depend on the size of the database. With respect to
the known (quantum and classical) strategies for private information retrieval, our protocol displays
an exponential reduction both in communication complexity and in running-time computational
complexity.
Privacy is a major concern in many information trans-
actions. A familiar example is provided by the transac-
tions between web search engines and their users. On
one hand, the user (say Alice) would typically prefer not
to reveal to the server the item she is interested in (user
privacy). On the other hand, the server (say Bob) would
like not to disclose more information than that Alice has
asked for (data privacy). User and data privacy are ap-
parently in conflict: the most straightforward way to ob-
tain user privacy is for Alice to have Bob send her the
entire database, leading to no data privacy whatsoever.
Conversely, techniques for guaranteeing the server’s data
privacy typically leave the user vulnerable [1]. At the
information theoretical level, this problem has been for-
malized by Gertner et al. as the Symmetrically-Private
Information Retrieval (SPIR) [1]. This is a generalization
of the Private Information Retrieval (PIR) problem [2]
which deals with user privacy alone. (SPIR is closely re-
lated to oblivious transfer [3], in which Bob sends to Alice
N bits, out of which Alice can access exactly one–which
one, Bob doesn’t know.) No efficient solutions in terms
of communication complexity [4] are known for SPIR.
Indeed, even rephrasing them at a quantum level [5, 6],
the best known solution for the SPIR problem (with a
single database server) employs O(N) qubits to be ex-
changed between the server and the user [7] and ensures
data privacy only in the case of honest users (here N is
the number of items contained in the database, while an
honest user is defined as one who does not want to com-
promise her chances of getting the information about the
selected item in order to get more). PIR admits proto-
cols that are more efficient in terms of communication
complexity [2]. As will be seen below, however, both
PIR and SPIR necessarily require O(N) computational
complexity on the part of the database.
In this paper we present a new quantum cryptographic
primitive [8], the quantum private query (QPQ), which
allows an exponential reduction in the communication
and computational complexity with respect to the best
(quantum or classical) SPIR protocol proposed so far.
QPQ ensures perfect data privacy and it exploits a
cheat sensitive strategy [9] that allows Alice to deter-
mine whether Bob has been trying to cheat to obtain
information about her query. In other words, Alice can
ask Bob’s database a question and obtain the answer,
together with a quantum certificate that Bob retains no
record of what question she asked. With respect to (clas-
sical or quantum) SPIR and oblivious transfer protocols
QPQ presents an exponential reduction in communica-
tion complexity. This comes from the fact that infor-
mation theoretic SPIR protocols require the exchange
of the whole database [7], O(N) qubits, while QPQ re-
quires the exchange of only two database elements, iden-
tified by O(logN) qubits. Quantum Private Queries also
provides an exponential reduction in computational com-
plexity over all classical PIR schemes, whether symmetric
or not. In both cryptographic and information-theoretic
PIR protocols, the owner(s) of the database(s) must per-
form O(N) ‘internal’ database calls in response to Alice’s
query. That is, as part of the protocol, Bob must per-
form operations that access every entry in his database,
using some cryptographic primitive such as a public key
supplied by Alice. If the PIR protocol requires Bob to
perform fewer than N internal database calls, then he
obtains information about Alice’s query simply by mon-
itoring which database entries were and were not called
in the course of executing the protocol. That is, a classi-
cal PIR protocol necessarily has database computational
complexity O(N) per query. In contrast, Quantum Pri-
vate Queries require only two internal database calls per
use, each using only O(logN) time steps [10].
Quantum private queries achieve two competing goals:
Bob can provide the service of private searching with-
out having to give up his database, and Alice can test
his honesty without having to trust him. The basic idea
underlying the protocol is simple: Bob, as a sign of his
discretion, returns not only the answer to Alice’s query,
but the original query itself, retaining no copy. Alice,
in addition to performing normal queries, can perform
also quantum superpositions of different queries. This
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FIG. 1: Scheme of the QPQ protocol. Alice wants to find out
the jth record of Bob’s database. She then prepares two n-
qubit registers, one contains the state |j〉Q, the other contains
the quantum superposition (|j〉Q + |0〉Q)/
√
2. (She knows
that the 0th record of Bob’s database contains the fixed value
A0 = 0). She then sends, in random order, these two registers
to Bob, waiting for his first reply before sending the second.
Bob uses each of the two registers to interrogate his database
using a qRAM device, which records the reply to her queries
in a register R. At the end of their exchange, Alice possesses
the states |j〉Q|Aj〉R and (|j〉Q|Aj〉R + |0〉Q|0〉R)/
√
2, where
the Aj is the content of the jth record in the database. By
measuring the first she obtains the value of Aj , with which
she can check whether the superposition in the second state
was preserved. In this case she can be confident Bob obtained
no information on what j was.
means that in addition to being able to request the jth
or the kth records in the database, she can also request
both records in a quantum superposition. To find out
whether Bob is trying to discover her queries, she just
has to send proper superpositions of queries and check
Bob’s answer to see whether the superposition has been
preserved. In this case, she can be confident that Bob
has retained no information about her query: any cap-
ture of information by Bob would have induced a distur-
bance. The user security rests on Bob’s impossibility of
discovering the generic quantum state of Alice’s query.
Two basic elements of quantum theory enforce this: the
no-cloning theorem [11] which forbids the discovery of
the state starting from a single copy of it [12], and the
inability fully to characterize a composite system using
only local operations. The database security of QPQ is
ensured by the finite number of signals Bob is sending
back to Alice. As we will see these can be as low as two.
This automatically implies that in the QPQ a dishonest
Alice will be able to recover at most two items from the
database to be compared with the O(logN) bits of in-
formation a dishonest user will be able to acquire in the
quantum SPIR protocols [6].
The rest of this paper is devoted to making the pre-
vious ideas rigorous and to providing the details of the
protocols. We start by describing the quantum commu-
nication protocol that Alice and Bob must follow, and
give a security analysis. We then conclude with a discus-
sion on how Bob can interrogate his database preserving
Alice’s superposed queries.
To submit her query on the jth record of Bob’s
database, Alice uses an n qubit memory register Q. It
allows her to interrogate a database of up to N = 2n
elements. To test whether Bob is cheating and is try-
ing to find out what her query is, she needs to submit
a superposition of queries. So she prepares two copies
of the register Q, one is initialized as |j〉Q, the other as
(|j〉Q+|0〉Q)/
√
2 (we suppose that the 0th record in Bob’s
database contains a fixed reference value known to her).
She then randomly chooses one of these two registers and
sends it to Bob. He interrogates his database using it
as an index register employing the qRAM algorithm de-
scribed below [see Eq. (4)]. It returns a second register R
which contains the answer to the query, and which may
be entangled with the register Q if the latter was in the
superposition state (without loss of generality we can as-
sume R to be a single qubit). Bob sends back the Q and
R registers to Alice. She then sends him her second Q
register, which, again, is employed by Bob to interrogate
his database and sent back to Alice together with a new
R register containing the answer to her second query. It
is important to stress that Bob never knows if the register
he receives from Alice is the one containing the quantum
superposition or the other one: this means he does not
know which measurement could extract information on
j without disturbing the register. The number of ex-
changed qubits is 2(n+1) = 2(logN+1) (of these only 2
contain information on the database). We see that, in at-
tempting to obtain information about Alice’s state, Bob
must try to distinguish between two possible states that
have overlap 1/
√
2. That is, Bob’s position is isomorphic
to that of Eve in conventional quantum cryptography,
and any attempt on his part to gain information must
necessarily be detected by Alice: the tradeoff between
the information that Bob can obtain and his probabil-
ity of being detected by Alice are essentially the same
as in quantum cryptography (see, e.g., [13]) as we now
demonstrate.
After this double exchange with Bob, Alice is in pos-
session of the two states |ψ1〉 = |j〉Q|Aj〉R and
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(
|j〉Q|Aj〉R + |0〉Q|A0〉R
)
, (1)
where Am is the content of the mth record in the
database (without loss of generality we can suppose that
A0 = 0). She can recover the value of Aj by measur-
ing |ψ1〉. This value answers her query, and can be used
to construct a measurement to test whether the second
state is really of the form |ψ2〉 given in Eq. (1). We will
show that if Bob is acquiring information on j, he will be
perturbing the superposition state |ψ2〉 and Alice has a
nonzero probability of finding it out. The only assump-
tion necessary (which may be dropped by complicating
the protocol slightly) is that the value Aj is uniquely
determined by j, i.e. that there cannot be two different
answers to one query.
3The simple protocol described here can be easily mod-
ified to increase its performance. First of all, in place of
the fixed superposition (|j〉Q + |0〉Q)/
√
2, we can allow
Alice to employ any arbitrary superposition α|j〉 + β|0〉
with complex amplitudes α and β unknown to Bob. In
this way Bob’s ability of masking his actions is greatly
reduced. More generally, instead of creating a superpo-
sition with the reference query |0〉Q, she could superim-
pose two (or more) different queries. In this case, in
addition to the query j which she is interested in, she
randomly chooses another query (say the k-th). Now
she prepares three n-qubits registers in the state |j〉, |k〉,
and (|j〉 + |k〉)/√2. As in the case discussed previously,
she sends the registers to Bob in random order and one-
by-one (i.e. she waits for Bob’s reply before submitting
the next). At the end of their exchange, if Bob has not
cheated, Alice is in possession of three states: i.e. |j〉|Aj〉,
|k〉|Ak〉, and (|j〉|Aj〉+ |k〉|Ak〉)/
√
2. She starts by mea-
suring the first two, in order to find out the values of Aj
and Ak: the former is the answer she was looking for,
the latter will be used to prepare a measurement to test
the third state to see whether the superposition has been
retained. In this case she can conclude that Bob has not
cheated. Notice that, in contrast to the classical strate-
gies where she hides her query among randomly chosen
ones, the security of the QPQ does not rest on the clas-
sical randomness of the queries. This is evident from the
simplest version of the protocol, where the single query
j is answered. However, this classical randomness is a
useful resource also for QPQ, since Alice can increase
the probability of catching a cheating Bob by choosing a
high number of random queries in her superposition.
The user security of the protocol rests on two key fea-
tures, namely, the fact that Alice is sending her queries
in random order, and the fact that she is sending them
one by one. The first feature prevents Bob from knowing
which kind of query he is receiving at each time: if he
knew when the superposed queries are arriving, he would
just let them through without measuring them and mea-
sure the other queries, finding out j and evading detec-
tion. The second feature prevents Bob from employing
joint measurements on the queries. In fact, if he was al-
lowed joint measurements, he would find out the value
of j since the subspaces spanned by the joint states of
Alice’s queries are orthogonal for different choices of j.
To discuss the user security of the protocol it is worth
starting from a simple cheating strategy. Suppose for
instance that Bob performs projective measurements on
both of Alice’s queries. By doing so he will always recover
the value of j. Moreover with probability 1/2, one of his
two measurement results will return 0 in correspondence
to Alice’s superposed query. In this case, Bob’s attempt
at cheating is successful, as he can correctly re-prepare
both of Alice’s queries. However, with probability 1/2,
Bob gets j from both measurements, and it will impos-
sible for him to determine which was the order of Alice’s
queries. In this case, no strategy of his has more than
1/2 probability of passing Alice’s test. In fact, this is
the probability that a state of the form |j〉Q|Aj〉R passes
the test of being of the form (|j〉Q|Aj〉R + |0〉Q|0〉R)/
√
2.
If Bob uses this cheating strategy, Alice can find it out
with probability 1/4 (this number can be easily increased
using the modified QPQ protocols discussed above).
What if Bob employs a more sophisticated cheating
strategy? Bob is presented randomly with one among
two possible scenarios (A or B) depending on which state
Alice sends first. These scenarios refer to the following
joint states of her query |SA〉 = |j〉Q1(|j〉Q2 + |r〉Q2 )/
√
2
and |SB〉 = (|j〉Q1 + |r〉Q1 )|j〉Q2/
√
2, where Q1 and Q2
are her first and second query. The failure of the above
cheating strategy stems from Bob’s impossibility to de-
termine which scenario Alice is using. This is a common
problem to all cheating strategies: it is related to the
non-orthogonality of the states |SA〉 and |SB〉, and to
the limit posed by the timing of the protocol (to gain
access to Q2, Bob must first respond to Q1). Working
along these lines, one can show that Alice has a nonzero
probability of discovering that Bob is cheating, whatever
sophisticated methods he employs. More precisely, fol-
lowing a derivation which is similar to that performed in
Ref. [13], it can be shown that his impossibility of per-
forming joint measurements onQ1 andQ2 places a bound
on the information Bob obtains on j: Alice can enforce
the privacy of her queries by requiring that Bob is never
caught cheating. Here we just sketch the main idea of
the security proof, providing the details elsewhere.
Any action by Bob in response to Alice’s two queries
can be described in terms of two unitary transformations
U1 and U2. The transformation U1 acts on the registers
Q1, R1 and on an ancillary systemB which is under Bob’s
control (it also includes his database). The transforma-
tion U2 acts on Q2, R2 and B. If Bob is not cheating, U1
and U2 are instances of the qRAM algorithm of Eq. (4)
below: they coherently copy the information from the
database to the R registers leaving the ancilla B in its
initial state. If instead Bob is cheating, at the end of the
communication the system B will be correlated with the
rest. In this case Alice’s final state is the mixture
ρℓ(j) ≡ TrB
[
U2U1|Ψℓ(j)〉〈Ψℓ(j)|U †1U †2
]
, (2)
where the label ℓ = A,B refers to the scenario used
by Alice to submit her query j, and where |Ψℓ(j)〉 ≡
|Sℓ〉Q1Q2 |0〉RB is the corresponding input state (|0〉RB be-
ing the initial state of the registers R1,2 and of the ancilla
B). The probability 1 − Pℓ(j) that the state ρℓ(j) sup-
plied by Bob will pass Alice’s test can be easily computed
by considering its overlap with the states corresponding
to the answer that a non-cheating Bob would provide.
On Bob’s side, the information IB that he retains on the
query is stored in the final state of the ancilla B, i.e.
σℓ(j) ≡ TrQ1Q2R1R2
[
U2U1|Ψℓ(j)〉〈Ψℓ(j)|U †1U †2
]
. (3)
4An information-disturbance trade-off [14] can be ob-
tained by noticing that if 1− Pℓ(j) ≃ 1, then σℓ(j) must
be independent from j. Specifically, requiring Pℓ(j) 6 ǫ
for all ℓ and j, one can show that 1 − F (σℓ(j), σ∗) 6
O(ǫ1/4), where σ∗ is a fixed state and F the fidelity [15].
Therefore, in the limit of Pℓ(j) → 0 (i.e. Bob passes the
test with high probability), we see that the states he re-
tains are independent from the label j. This can also
transformed into an upper bound on the mutual infor-
mation IB evaluating the Holevo information [16] asso-
ciated to the ensemble {pj, σ(j)} where pj = 1/N is the
probability that Alice will send the j-th query, and where
σ(j) = [σA(j)+ σB(j)]/2 is the final state of B (from his
point of view), since Alice randomly chooses among the
scenarios A and B with probability 1/2. By doing so it
can be shown [17] that IB 6 O(ǫ
1/4 log
2
N).
In closing, we comment on the quantum random ac-
cess memory (qRAM) algorithm [10, 14] that Bob uses
to interrogate his database while preserving coherence,
as required by the QPQ protocol. The aim of the qRAM
protocol is to read, in a memory array, a location speci-
fied by an index register Q, and return the contents in a
second register R. The register Q may contain a quan-
tum superposition of location addresses. The content of
the n-qubit address-register Q is correlated by a unitary
transformation U to the spatial position of a single qubit,
which acts as a data bus. This means that the binary en-
coding in the quantum register is translated into a unary
encoding on the location of the bus qubit, which is thus
into one of 2n possible locations (or in more than one lo-
cation in quantum superposition). Now the qubit locally
interacts with the memory cell array, and the addressing
procedure is reversed by running the binary-to-unary en-
coding U protocol backwards (an “uncomputation” per-
formed by the unitary U †). This decorrelates the position
of the bus qubit from the Q register (otherwise quantum
coherence would be destroyed). Its internal state con-
tains the value of the memory cell (cells) that was to be
read. Essentially, the qRAM algorithm implements the
transformation
∑
j
αj |j〉Q →
∑
j
αj |j〉Q|Aj〉R , (4)
where Aj is the content of the jth memory location, and
αj are arbitrary amplitudes.
Conventional designs for quantum random access
memory based on classical architectures [14] require
O(2n) quantum logic operations to perform a qRAM call.
However, we have recently exhibited qRAM designs in
which the number of quantum logic operations to per-
form a call can be reduced to O(n) [10]. Hence, con-
structing a qRAM for quantum private queries should be
significantly easier than constructing a large-scale quan-
tum computer.
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